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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AS IT
APPLIES TO SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
FRANCIS SCOTT BALDWIN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1960 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the famous
case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,1 which ushered into be-
ing the body of law referred to today variously as strict liability,
liability without fault, or the law of products liability. Most states
apply the concept of strict liability, in some form, when a defective
product causes injury. The basis for this doctrine is section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts.'
The obvious question arises: Should this doctrine apply to one
who sells a service as well as to one who sells a product? For ex-
ample, does the theory of strict liability apply to one who furnishes
a service such as the Jefferson Chart Service to pilots? Does it
apply, for instance, to one who overhauls an airplane engine and
does so improperly, though none of the parts are defective? What
* LL.B., 1953, Univ. of Texas School of Law; B.A., 1949, North Texas State
Univ.; President, Texas Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 1965-66; Governor, Ass'n of Trial
Lawyers of America, 1973-76; Chairman, Railroad Section, Ass'n of Trial Law-
yers of America, 1973-74.
132 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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about one who improperly repairs a TV set, hot water heater,
or other similar appliance? This whole area involving services
rendered and hybrid transactions that do not involve the sale of a
product as such poses a question that is not easily determined. The
law in this area is far from settled; however, certain trends are
emerging.
The purpose of this paper is to explore this gray area involving
liability for services rendered and kindred transactions in view of
the law as it exists today and to comment on the courses that courts
in the future may follow. Basically there are two types of services:
professional services and non-professional services.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
With one notable exception,' the courts have almost unani-
mously refused to extend the doctrine of strict liability, or liability
without fault, to one who renders a professional service. Most
certainly the courts have refused to extend the doctrine of strict
liability to doctors and dentists.
Doctors-Dentists
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Barbee v. Rogers,' refused to
extend the concept of strict liaiblity to services rendered by an
optometrist in prescribing and fitting contact lenses. In Barbee
there were jury findings that contact lenses were not reasonably
fit for the use on the surface of the plaintiff's eyes;' that they caused
injury to the tissues of the plaintiff's eyes;' and that the failure of
the contact lens to reasonably fit was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.' The court declined to apply the theory of
strict liability in tort. Although the court recognized that it had
adopted section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, it refused
to hold the optometrist strictly liable for the injuries when the
injuries were not due to the product itself.' The court noted
that this was not the act of one selling a "product in a defective
' See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 infra.




8 Id. at 346.
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condition unreasonably dangerous to the user" and that the policy
considerations supporting the rule of strict liability were not pres-
ent. It said, instead, that the activities of the defendant fell between
those ordinarily associated with the practice of a profession and
those characteristics of a merchandising concern. In refusing to
extend this doctrine to the services of an optometrist the court said
that the miscarriage, if one existed, was in the professional acts of
the optometrist and not in a defective commodity that was sold
At about the same time, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused
to extend the doctrine of strict liability to the services of a dentist.
In Margrine v. Krasnica0 the plaintiff sought to invoke the doctrine
of strict liability against the dentist in an action to recover for
personal injuries caused by the breaking of a hypodermic needle
used to inject a local anesthetic into the plaintiff's jaw. The plain-
tiff argued that all of the basic policy considerations for applying
the doctrine of strict liability were present. The New Jersey court
rejected this argument for several reasons. First, it said that the
dentist was in no better position than the plaintiff to discover the
defect in the needle.1' Second, the court said that the dentist did
not put the article into the stream of commerce nor did he promote
its purchase by the public." Third, the Court rejected the plaintiff's
contention that the dentist was in a position to spread the risk by
obtaining liability insurance. It pointed out that the "risk distribu-
tion" theory is a relevant consideration only where the party that
put the goods in the stream of commerce may fairly be assumed
to have substantial assets. 3 Fourth, the court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the dentist should be held liable because he could
implead the manufacturer, finding that the dentist was not and
could not be certain who the manufacturer was." Finally, the
court added that the relevant policy considerations would not
justify imposition of strict liability upon a dentist in this instance,
concluding that to do so would be to add an irrational consequence
91d.
1094 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub norm. Magrine v. Spec-
tor, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968).
11 227 A.2d at 543.
1 1 Id.
"Id. at 544.
I4 d. at 545.
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to a laudable progress achieved in the field of tort law.1"
The New Jersey Supreme Court again addressed the question
of whether to apply the doctrine of strict liability to professional
services in Magna v. Beth Israel Hospital."0 The plaintiff in Magna
was injured by a plastic surgeon and sought to bring an action
against him based on the theory of breach of warranty and strict
liability. The court held that the doctrines of breach of warranty
and strict liability were not applicable to the medical or dental
professions" and hence dismissed the allegations of malpractice
based on these theories. It simply refused to extend the doctrine of
strict liability to these type services.
Engineering Services
The Alabama Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of strict
liability to engineering services, but other courts have declined to
do so. In Broyles v. Brown Engineering,8 a civil engineering firm
had contracted to supply the plaintiff with a drainage survey.
The Alabama court held that in doing so, the engineering firm
implicitly warranted the sufficiency and adequacy of the plans and
specifications. It distinguished the engineering profession from the
professions of medicine, law, and architecture, finding that the
latter professions involved uncontrollable factors. An engineering
survey of drainage requirements of a tract of land did not entail
unknown and uncontrollable factors. The court said that a con-
tracting party had the right to expect that such a survey be done
with reasonable accuracy and should not be dependent in his effort
to recover damages on the burdensome allegation of negligence."
The Third Circuit, in La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., Inc.,"0
however, refused to extend the concept of strict liability to services
rendered by an engineering company. La Rossa involved wrongful
death and survival actions under New Jersey law. The defendant
had contracted to design, engineer, and supervise the construction
and initial operation of a plant for the manufacture of phthalic
15 Id. at 547.
14 120 N.J. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363 (1972).
17 295 A.2d at 366.
18 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
'9 151 So. 2d at 772.
20402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
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anhydride. The operations created a dust which caused a toxic
reaction. After exposure to the dust, the plaintiff's decedent was
found to have a cancerous growth in his throat. The plaintiff sought
to hold the engineering company liable on two grounds, negligence,
and the express and implied warranties that the process of installa-
tion would be reasonably safe. The trial court dismissed the count
based on an express warranty, and the jury found in favor of the
defendant on the negligence count. 1 In affirming the verdict for
the defendant, the court of appeals concluded that the concept of
strict liability should not be extended to one rendering professional
services. The court said that professional services do not ordinarily
lend themselves to the doctrine of tort liability without fault be-
cause they lacked the elements which would give rise to the doc-
trine.' Neither mass production of goods nor large body of distant
consumers whom it would be unfair to require to trace the article
back to its original source of manufacture and who might have
no knowledge or ability to inquire about a possible defect were
present here. The court pointed out that the engineering services
involved were highly specialized and affected only a small group.'
Similarly, the California court declined to extend the doctrine of
strict liability to engineering services in Stuart v. Crestview Mutual
Water Co." In Stuart the engineering company had designed, engi-
neered, and constructed a water system. The plaintiffs were prop-
erty owners seeking substantial damages because they were unable
to protect their property from fire due to an inadequate supply
and flow of water. The court refused to hold the engineering firm
strictly liable finding that it had rendered a professional service and
was in no sense analagous to manufacturers who placed products
on the market and are in the best position to spread cost of in-
juries resulting from the defective product.'
The California court also refused to extend the concept of strict
liability to an engineering firm that tested the soil prior to construc-
tion of the plaintiff's house. In Swett v. Gribaldo, Jones & Asso-
21 Id. at 939.
"I d. at 942-43.
2Id. at 943.
"434 Cal. App. 3d 573, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973).
2110 Cal. Rpt. at 549.
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ciates,"° the plaintiffs had sought damages for cracks in the house
resulting from soil instability. The appellate court reversed a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, saying that the doctrine of strict liability
would not apply where the defendant was employed solely in an
advisory capacity, was paid by the hour, had no interest in the
property tested, and did not participate in the sale."
A Florida court would not apply the doctrine of implied war-
ranty of fitness in an action involving engineering services con-
nected to the design of a chattel. 8 The court did hold, however,
that the engineering firm could be held liable on theories of
negligence.
NON-PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
The courts are likewise reluctant to apply the doctrine of strict
liability to cases involving non-professional services, although few
of the policy considerations alluded to in professional services
cases exist in the cases involving non-professional services. The
strict liability concept was applied, however, in the New Jersey
case of Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc." The rule of strict liability
was held to apply to a beauty parlor operator for injury to a cus-
tomer's hair and scalp allegedly resulting from use of a permanent
wave solution since the operator of the beauty parlor sold or
applied the product in the regular course of its business. It is im-
portant to note that the court did not specifically hold the beauty
parlor operator strictly liable for mistakes in her application of
the solution but rather the liability was predicated on defects in
the solution itself. The Supreme Court of New Jersey did not
consider whether it would have found the doctrine applicable in
Newmark had the injuries been caused, not by a defective solution,
but rather by improper application by the operator. Certainly the
policy arguments for applying the concept of strict liability would
have been the same in both situations.
The servicer of an airplane was not held strictly liable under
240 Cal. App. 3d 802, 115 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1974).
27 115 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
2'Audlane Lumber & Builder Supply v. D.E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So. 2d
233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See text accompanying note 72 infra.
29 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697
(1969).
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New Jersey law in the recent case of Raritan Trucking Corp. v.
Aero Commander, Inc."° This case involved an action by the
owner of an airplane against an airplane servicer to recover prop-
erty damage resulting from a plane crash. There was an alleged
failure of the landing gear precipitating the crash, and the plaintiff
sought to hold the servicer strictly liable as he had done extensive
work on the landing gear immediately before the fatal flight. The
Third Circuit refused to extend the concept of strict liability to
cover the servicer. It noted that from its origin in the Henningsen
case, the strict liability theory has grown to be a strong one in
New Jersey, however, no New Jersey case had extended the strict
liability theory to a case in which there have been no goods or other
property supplied." The court distinguished Newmark v. Gimbel's,
Inc., by saying that the court in Newmark did not hold that the
beauty parlor operator would have been strictly liable for non-
negligent mistakes in her own application of the solution, but only
for the defects in the solution itself." The court further said that
although Raritan might be distinguishable from the professional
services of a doctor or dentist, such distinction would not be
sufficient to cause the New Jersey Supreme Court to apply strict
liability in such a case.33
Defective Blood Cases
A series of cases has evolved relating to services of a hospital or
other institution supplying blood containing the disease of serum
hepatitis. In Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood
Bank, Inc.," the plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained when she contracted serum hepatitis from a
transfusion of impure blood supplied by the defendant blood bank,
a non-profit corporation. In Balkowitsch the plaintiff's claim was
based on breach of implied warranty. The court affirmed a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, saying that the providing of
blood constituted a service rather than a sale and thus the concept
of implied warranty would not apply.' The court evidenced the
30458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972).
31 Id. at 1114.
"
2 Id. at 1115.
33 Id.
34270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
5Id. at 810.
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tendency to rely heavily upon policy considerations in cases of
this sort and said that it found it difficult to give literal application
of principles of law designed to impose strict accountability in
commercial transactions to a voluntary and charitable activity
which serves a humane and public health purpose.'
The New Jersey court in Brody v. Overlook Hospital" refused
to apply strict liability to a blood transfusion case. The action was
for the death of a patient caused by serum hepatitis secondary to
a blood transfusion. The court said that due to the scientific in-
ability to test for the presence of viral hepatitis, blood should be
placed within the category of "unavoidably unsafe products," and
therefore it was not an "unreasonably dangerous" product to which
strict liability could apply."' On appeal the court left open, how-
ever, the question whether the strict liability doctrine might be
applied to other cases involving services.'
A federal court applying the Tennessee law in Sawyer v. Method-
ist Hospital of Memphis," declined to extend the doctrine to blood
transfusions. The court said that a blood transfusion from which
the plaintiff may have contracted hepatitis was not a sale to which
implied warranties of merchantibility or fitness or strict liability
could apply.' The California court in Shepard v. Alexian Bros.
Hospital, Inc.,' also refused to apply the concept of strict liability
in a blood transfusion case. The court in Shepard held that the
furnishing of blood by a hospital to a patient was a service and
not a sale under a statute providing that the transfusion of blood
shall be construed for all purposes to be the rendition of a service.'
A similar holding was reached in New York in Simone v. Long
30 Id.
31 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974), a/f'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d
596 (1975). See also Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075,
cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974).
38 317 A.2d at 397.
39 332 A.2d at 597: "There are indications that subsequent to 1966 tests may
have become available for discovering the viral infection but for present purposes
we need not consider ... whether their present availability would hereafter result
in accountability under the theory of strict liability in tort."
40383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975).
41 Id. at 568.
133 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
"' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1970).
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Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center," where it was held that the
furnishing of blood to a patient was a service and not a sale, and
therefore the hospital could not be strictly liable for the patient's
hepatitis. In contrast to these, however, the Pennsylvania court
held in Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital," that a complaint for
damages for death allegedly caused by a transfusion of impure
blood stated a cause of action against a hospital which "sold"
blood to a patient under the theory of implied warranty of
merchantability and for implied warranty of fitness for the par-
ticular purpose. '
Electric Service
There have been several cases from Michigan holding that the
sale of electricity is the performance of a service rather than the
sale of a product and that the doctrine of strict liability applies.
In Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Detroit Edison Co.,' the
Michigan court held that implied warranties of fitness and mer-
chantability applied to the sale of electric services, but it found
that there was no proof of defect. In so holding the court said:
"We are of the opinion that the implied warranties, as defined by
the courts of this state, should apply to the sale of services as well
as to the sale of goods." The court went on to say that certainly
the doctrine should be applied in the instance of the service of
electricity which was an inherently dangerous product and that
the courts should proceed in this area on a case by case basis for
the present.'
Thereafter, in the case of Insurance Company of North America
v. Radiant Electric Co." a similar result was reached, with the
court citing the Buckeye case. In Radiant the loss was the result
of an electric current, and the Michigan court held that the law
of implied warranty would apply to "the sale of services as well as
to the sale of goods."' 1 Finally, the Michigan Court of Appeals in
4481 Misc. 2d 163, 364 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1975).
4439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
46 267 A.2d at 870.
"138 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972).
41 196 N.W.2d at 317.
4" Id. at 318.
:0 55 Mich. App. 410, 222 N.W.2d 323 (1974).
'1 222 N.W.2d at 324.
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the case of Williams v. Detroit Edison Co.," in which leave to
appeal was denied, reaffirmed these holdings. Again electric power
was involved, and the court said: "Electricity is a service rather
than a 'good,' but the doctrine of implied warranty has been applied
to its sale."' 3 It is seen, therefore, that the Michigan courts have
left little doubt but that they will apply the law of implied war-
ranty in the instance of services, particularly electric power.
Repairer's Services to Tools and Machinery
The California court in Young v. Aro Corp." held the manu-
facturer-seller-repairer of a portable grinder liable for repairs to
the grinding wheel. The plaintiffs had alleged liability under the
theory of strict liability, and the court said that whatever might
have been defendant's strict liability exposure as a repairer, its
acceptance of the grinder for repair with instructions made it the
manufacturer of the repaired grinder. The California court thus
sidestepped the question of whether one who merely repairs a
product may be held strictly liable for the service.'
Nor has the doctrine of strict liability been extended to one
who rendered boiler repair services. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
v. Superior Burner Service Co.," the Pepsi Cola company sought
to recover damages for losses which resulted from the defendant's
alleged failure to properly repair a boiler. The complaint was
based on separate causes of action sounding in negligence and
in breach of implied warranty. The court said that in this area of
the law, strict liability has not been imposed on those who furnish
labor and services."
It is evident that very few courts have applied the concept of
strict liability to services rendered, whether professional or non-
professional. The courts reject this concept much more readily in
professional cases dealing with doctors and dentists where the
1163 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975).
53 234 N.W.2d at 705.
6436 Cal. App. 3d 240, 111 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1974).
5111 Cal. Rptr. at 538. But see Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270
Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974), in which the Oregon Supreme Court held that strict
liability did not extend to an alleged failure to tighten lug nuts on an automobile
wheel in an action against one who installed the tire.
"427 P.2d 833 (Alas. 1967). See also Samuelson v. Chutich, 187 Colo. 155,
529 P.2d 631 (1974).
57 427 P.2d at 839.
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policy considerations for not applying the doctrine appear strong-
est. There is a greater tendency to apply the concept of strict
liability to engineers who perform services and to non-professional
people who perform services, as the policy considerations appear
less compelling and at times quite indistinguishable from those
that are relied upon to apply the doctrine of strict liability to
products manufactured.
Perhaps the underlying justification for the courts' reluctance to
apply the concept of strict liability to services rendered is that the
basis for the doctrine of strict liability is found in section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts." The Restatement addresses itself
quite specifically to products sold. A strong argument can be made
that this section of the Restatement was not meant to apply to
services rendered. This especially becomes apparent in light of
section 324A of the Restatement which deals specifically with
services.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SERVICES NEGLIGENTLY RENDERED
WITHOUT REGARD TO PRIVITY
Although the present trend is for the courts not to extend the
doctrine of strict liability to those persons who render services,
there exists an equal indication of a trend toward holding such per-
sons liable to third persons on the basis of negligence without
regard to privity. This concept of liability stems from the estab-
lished principle that one who is negligent in the manufacture of
an imminently dangerous product is responsible to those who are
injured by the product. This rule was born of necessity as an
exception to the rule of Winterbottom v. Wright,"0 which required
"' See note 2 supra.
0 0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to
the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to
the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.
60 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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privity before liability would exist in a tort action. It was embraced
and somewhat relaxed in the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co." As stated by Dean Prosser, the MacPherson rule has
swept the country, and "with the barely possible but highly unlikely
exceptions of Mississippi and Virginia, no American jurisdiction
now refuses to accept it."" There remains little doubt that prac-
tically all courts would impose liability, without regard to privity,
where one is injured by an imminently or inherently dangerous
product that was negligently manufactured. The question then be-
comes, will the courts impose liability upon a manufacturer who
negligently produces a product that is not imminently or inherently
dangerous without regard to privity. All indications are that they
would.
Certainly the text writers support this view. The American and
English Encyclopedia of Law states:
Where there has been negligence in the construction or preparation
of the article sold or supplied-that is, where, under the circum-
stances, injuries to the other contracting party or third persons
might reasonably have been anticipated as a result of defects or
errors therein-the question of privity of contract seems wholly
immaterial. The liability depends upon the rule of natural and
proximate cause and contemplation of consequences."
This principle had likewise been expressed as early as 1957 in
an article in Virginia Law Review: "However the requirement of
privity for a tort action has gradually disappeared until today the
manufacturer's duty of care generally extends to any injury or
damage which foreseeably may result from defects in his product."'
The question of whether a product is inherently dangerous has
become increasingly less significant. MacPherson itself effectively
eliminated the requirement of an inherently or imminently danger-
ous product, as the court defined such a product as follows: "If
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
61217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
62 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960). Both states have since adopted this rule. See
Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962); Hempstead
v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
"21 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 461-62 (1896).
"Note, 43 VA. L. REV. 273 (1957).
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danger."" Since this holding in MacPherson, the necessity of de-
termining in a suit for negligence which products are inherently
dangerous and which are not has been rendered largely academic."'
It is seen that the Restatement of Torts addresses the question
of potential liability for one who renders a service. Section 324A
states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability
to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm ....
Although section 324A does not specifically address the question
of privity, it is significant that it makes no reference to an immi-
nently dangerous service.
Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp." held that one
who supplies, a service such as approving the design of a fire
extinguisher may be responsible in negligence without regard to
privity. In Hempstead one of the defendants, Underwriters Testing
Company, was charged, among other things, with negligently ap-
proving the design of a fire extinguisher. The court squarely posed
the question for determination to be whether Underwriters, a
testing corporation, could be held liable under Virginia law for
plaintiff's injuries based upon Underwriters' alleged negligence
when no relationship of privity existed between the parties."' The
court pointed out that Underwriters neither manufactured nor sold
the extinguisher and that no privity of contract or other legal rela-
tionship existed between Underwriters and the plaintiffs. The court
held that under these circumstances, Underwriters could be re-
sponsible under negligence principles without regard to privity."*
Although the court found the product involved to be imminently
dangerous, it left little doubt that the same result would have been
" I11 N.E. at 1053.
"See, e.g., Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
0
7RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
8 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
"d. at 111.
70 1d. at 112.
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reached had the product not been deemed to be imminently
dangerous.'
A similar result was reached in Audlane Lumber & Building
Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Associates, Inc."2 In Audlane it was
held that one who prepares a design and specifications to be used
by a manufacturer in constructing a chattel may be liable in
negligence to a third person. This principle of liability was adhered
to in Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"3 in which it was
held that a cause of action was stated against an insurer who con-
tracted to provide safety engineering services by making periodic
inspections of the insured's premises to detect hazardous conditions.
In this case the decedent was a fireman who was killed while fight-
ing a fire on the insured's premises. The court, relying upon section
324A, held that a cause of action was stated.'
SUMMARY
Thus far the courts have not extended the doctrine of strict lia-
bility to doctors, dentists, lawyers, or related professional people
who perform services. Some courts have applied strict liability
principles to engineers, and at least one state, Michigan, has ap-
plied this doctrine to one who furnishes the service of electricity,
with the indication that it might be extended in the future. A ma-
jority of the courts, however, have not applied this doctrine to
professional or non-professional people who render services. It
must be remembered that the majority of jurisdictions in the
country have not had an opportunity to address the question.
The question of liability for supplying blood seems to fall in a
category by itself. Most courts refuse to apply the doctrine of
strict liability to these cases, although the results are reached
through different means. In fact, some states, such as California
and Ohio," have enacted statutes to insure that strict liability
principles not be applied to these cases.
'
1ld. at 118.
72 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
78348 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
11 Id. at 628-29.
'5E.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Page 1976):
The procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or
using human whole blood, plasma, blood products, corneas, bones,
organs, or other human tissue except hair, for the purpose of in-
jecting, transfusing, or transplanting any of them in the human
SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
The hybrid transaction, which contains elements of both a sale
and a service rendered, has likewise been considered by the courts.
A notable example is the situation involving the application of a
beauty solution with an unfavorable result." Here, strict liability
is usually applied with the justification that the transaction actually
contained more of the characteristics of the sale of a product than
the rendition of a service.
The trend is evident that courts will hold one who renders a
service liable on principles of negligence, and this is true without
regard to whether privity exists.
Since its inception, the doctrine of strict liability has virtually
exploded in all directions. We have seen it applied in many areas
beyond that of a strict sale of a product. For example, it has been
applied to people engaged in commercial leasing, rental, or bail-
ment of chattels for hire." It has been applied to gifts of defective
products." Strict liability has also been applied to occupiers who
license invitees to use defective machines on their premises." Like-
wise, certifiers and endorsers have been held liable for testing and
certifying defective products supplied by others.8"
body, is declared for all purposes to be the rendition of a service
by every person, firm, or corporation participating therein, whether
or not any remuneration is paid therefor, is declared not to be a
sale of such items, and no warranties of any kind or description are
applicable thereto.
"8 It is submitted that one who furnishes an approach chart service to pilots
may well fall within this category. One state district court in Arizona has so held.
Sylvia Jeanette Sisk v. The Times Mirror Co., No. 139,351 (Ariz. Sup. Ct.) (not
reported).
"1Smith v. Alexandria Arena, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Va. 1969); Mc-
Claflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1969); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv. Co., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
See also 19 DRAKE L. REV. 235 (1969); 11 VrLL. L. REv. 404 (1965).
78 Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939); Toombs v. Fort
Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968); Bainter v. Lamoine L.P. Gas Co.,
24 Ill. App. 3d 913, 321 N.E.2d 744 (1974); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v.
Kondaris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Guinan v. Famous Players-
Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929).
"Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock Shops, 248 Ark. 1, 449 S.W.2d 692 (1970);
Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970); Le Buzz, Inc.
v. Sniderman, 171 Colo. 246, 466 P.2d 457 (1970); Thompson v. Reilly, 211
So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1968).
"Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314
(1972); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519
(1969); Buszta v. Souther, 102 R.I. 609, 232 A.2d 396 (1967).
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It appears that although courts are expanding the doctrine of
strict liability in most other areas, they are reluctant to do so in
transactions involving the performance of services. In such circum-
stances, instead, requirements of privity have been relaxed, and
liability has been imposed on theories of negligence.
CONCLUSION
Without numerating the various policy reasons that exist favor-
ing the imposition of the strict liability doctrine, can it really be
said that the reasons favoring the doctrine in cases involving prod-
ucts manufactured are different than those involving a service
rendered? Is there any difference between a company that manu-
factures automobiles on the one hand and a large engineering firm
on the other that sells its services, i.e., preparing plans and specifi-
cations, providing supervision for work, or a score of other services?
We live in the age of the computer. Many companies are in the
business of furnishing to others various services through the use
of the computer. Examples of these type services are companies
that perform billing services for others, make payrolls, keep inven-
tory, and provide correspondence. This business is in its infancy.
The extent to which it is bound to expand is limited only by one's
imagination. Is there a real difference between such a computer
service rendered and a product manufactured? It is submitted that
the policy reasons distinguishing the field of products manufactured
from services rendered in the application of strict liability prin-
ciples represent a distinction without a difference.
One question that arises is whether strict liability should be im-
posed on the type of case involving one who furnished blood that
turns out to be defective. Suppose for sake of argument that the
supplying of blood or other services rendered is such that the de-
fect cannot be detected? If in fact the supplying of blood is a
service, the submission very well could be in terms of whether it
was reasonably fit for its intended use and not unreasonably
dangerous. The generally accepted definition of "unreasonably
dangerous" is: "The article . . . must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user
who [uses] it with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics." 1
11 Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975). See also W. PROSSER, HAND-
SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
The above submission, with appropriate variations, can apply to
practically any type products liability case. These definitions, if
applied to services rendered, would certainly accommodate the
case where the service rendered contains a defect impossible to de-
tect. Should not the submission be, in its simplest terms, is the
product made or service rendered reasonably fit for its intended use
so as not to be unreasonably dangerous to users; or is it unreason-
ably dangerous to such users?
This test should apply to all persons who perform services, pro-
fessional and non-professional. This is not to say that the physician,
the supplier of blood, the lawyer, the architect, or other profes-
sional person who performs a service should be held strictly liable
per se when a bad result is achieved. Rather, it should be recog-
nized that the practice of medicine, and related services, depends
on factors beyond the control of the practitioner. Likewise, the
legal profession is not an exact science and depends in many in-
stances on varying interpretations. These same considerations are
evident in the field of architecture and in other fields of endeavor.
All of these factors could and should be taken into account by
the triers of fact, with the aid of appropriate instructions,"2 in de-
termining whether the service was "reasonably fit for its intended
use" or "unreasonably dangerous" to users. These questions should
be answered within the broad guidelines of whether the service
rendered was done with reasonable accuracy chargeable to that
particular profession or vocation. In other words, one who holds
himself out to be competent to furnish a particular service should
expect to be charged with an expectation of reasonable results,
and failure to perform adequately should fall within the ambit of
the doctrine variously referred to as strict liability, liability without
fault, or products liability.
BOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS 659 (4th ed. 1971). Another submission might be:
"A defective product is one that is not reasonably fit for ordinary purposes for
which such products are intended or may reasonably be expected to be used."
"In addition to the definition of "unreasonably dangerous," see note 81
supra, the following instruction in connection with the term "defective service" is
suggested:
You are instructed that in determining whether the service ren-
dered was defective, such service must have been performed with
reasonable accuracy chargeable to the profession (or business) of
the defendant. If it was not so performed, then it was defective.
19771

